On January 11, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that federal discrimination laws do not protect church employees who perform religious duties. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2012 WL 75047 (Jan. 11, 2007), the Court recognized that the “ministerial exception” under the First Amendment protects religious institutions from discriminatory discharge where the former employee qualifies as a “minister.” Although the term “minister” is not strictly defined, the term may apply to those who conduct worship or serve as a messenger or teacher of faith.
Cheryl Perich, a former teacher, alleged that Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School violated the Americans with Disabilities Act when it fired her after she was diagnosed with narcolepsy. During her employment at the church-run school, Perich served as a “called” teacher, instructing students in religious and secular classes, and occasionally led chapel services. Perich developed narcolepsy in 2004 and spent the beginning of the school year on disability leave. When she reported back to work, her supervisor informed her that the school had filled her position. After Perich refused to resign, the school discharged her.
Perich filed a charge with the EEOC, who brought a complaint in federal district court. In its defense, Hosanna-Tabor claimed that the lawsuit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims concerned the employment relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers. Although the District Court granted summary judgment for Hosanna-Tabor, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case. The Sixth Circuit held that Perich did not qualify as a minister due to her secular teaching duties, thus Hosanna-Tabor could not use the First Amendment to protect itself from her legal claim. Hosanna-Tabor appealed to the Supreme Court for review.
In its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Perich was indeed a minister under the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. The Court noted that Perich was a commissioned minister who underwent significant religious training for her position as a “called” teacher. The Court also acknowledged that, although unordained teachers sometimes performed religious duties at the school, they did so when ordained teachers were unavailable. Finally, the Court criticized the Sixth Circuit for placing too much emphasis on Perich’s secular job duties, noting that time spent performing religious duties cannot be considered alone. Because Perich was a minister under the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, she could not sue her Hossana-Tabor for discharging her.
The holding provides guidance for religious education establishments. Although the Court declined to “adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister,” the Court’s determination of the ministerial role is more encompassing than those adopted by lower appeals courts.
Author(s): Brett J. Schneider & Brooke P. Dolara
